

PUBLIC STATEMENTS & ADMISSIONS

FROM LATEST
GOV'T EXHIBIT
(4th Exh. on this
subject)

The Pentagon Paper

War Bulletin Included

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Legal Tangle Delays Trial

In June, 1971, articles from the Pentagon Papers, a secret government document about the Vietnam War, appeared in the New York Times. Soon afterwards, Dan Ellsberg and Tony Russo were arrested. They were charged with stealing government documents, spying against the government, and conspiring to commit both these acts.

The Ellsberg-Russo trial (known as the Pentagon Papers Trial) began in early July of this year. By July 21, the jury was sworn in. But three days later, Judge Byrne threw the case into total confusion. On that date, the judge admitted that the government had begged a conversation carried on by a member of the defense team.

The defense argued that it was entitled to know the contents of the tapped conversation. This was denied by Judge Byrne on July 27. The next day the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals looked up that decision.

The defense then appealed to Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who hears cases from the Ninth Circuit for the Supreme Court. Justice Douglas ruled that the issues were important enough to delay the trial until the Supreme Court as a whole could decide whether it wanted to hear the defense motions.

The Supreme Court is now on vacation and will decide whether to hear the case when it reconvenes in October. If at that time the Court decides that it does not want to hear the arguments about the wiretapping, the trial will most likely start around the middle of October. If four justices decide that the case is important enough for the Supreme Court to hear, the trial will be adjourned to be delayed and would probably not start again until after January, six months after the trial first began.



Ellsberg Meets the Press

President Nixon consciously planned to escalate the Indochina War from the moment he took office. His secret plan to end the war was in fact a new phase of escalation, involving all of the technological might that the U.S. could muster. A strategy in which the U.S. removed itself from Vietnam was never considered by the President and his policy-makers.

These were the points emphasized by Daniel Ellsberg at a news conference on August 22. Stating that Nixon embarked "on a conscious policy that precluded any possibility of peace then or now," the former government analyst and Rand researcher outlined the development of the Nixon policy.

Secret Operations

He also talked about some of the secret military operations which were carried out in the first ten weeks of the administration. These led to the widening of the war, and were the first steps of Nixon's escalation.

In December of 1969, Ellsberg

was head of a Rand project which outlined the options available to the new administration. Developed at the request of top Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger, the paper listed seven possible courses of action. These ranged from total war to unilateral American withdrawal.

A second draft of the paper was sent to the National Security Council to be formally considered as the basis for the new policy. Although this draft was described to the press as encompassing "the complete range of options," there was one important difference between the second draft and the first. In the second draft, Kissinger eliminated the option of a planned American withdrawal by a fixed date. The National Security Council was presented with six possible strategies, each of which guaranteed a continued military involvement in Vietnam. Each demanded the survival of the Thieu regime.

The plan which was adopted — Nixon's "secret plan to end the war" — turned out to be a policy of

escalation. While troop withdrawals were being carried out, the bombing increased.

Nixon's Escalation

At the press conference Ellsberg described three secret operations which took place in 1969 to draw North Vietnam into the war. The first of these was a prolonged Marine invasion of Laos. Heavy B-52 raids were then carried out in Cambodia. Navy frogmen were sent into Haiphong harbor. They were deliberately allowed to be captured by the North Vietnamese. This operation was never made public until the Ellsberg press conference. It was meant to be a signal to the North Vietnamese that the U.S. was prepared to mine the port.

Ellsberg's main point was that the Administration never considered a policy of withdrawal — a policy favored by 73 percent of the American people. While Nixon talked peace, he made preparations for further war.

Local Labor Backs McGovern

"We're going to enthusiastically support him."

With this statement, Gordon McCulloch, head of the Carpenters Union District Council of Southern California AFL-CIO, joined dozens of other labor officials in both local and state AFL-CIO bodies across the country which have publicly backed the presidential candidacy of Senator George McGovern.

These endorsements, opposing the decisions of the national AFL-CIO leadership under George Meany, have sent shock waves throughout the organized labor movement. They could produce important changes in the Federation well past the November elections.

Convention Controversy

The controversy was apparent at the California State AFL-CIO convention held in Los Angeles in late August. Although the convention failed to pass any presidential endorsement, pro McGovern feelings ran very high.

The delegates were undecided at the early stages of the convention. Al Barker, national COPE (Committee on Political Education) director, was publicly asked when he defended AFL-CIO president George Meany's position of not supporting either McGovern or Nixon. Resolutions calling for Nixon's defeat were submitted by three Bay Area labor organizations. But the state AFL leadership would not allow a floor

vote on these resolutions or any other motions favorable to McGovern.

But when Senator John Tunney (Dem-Calif.) addressed the convention and called for a McGovern victory, he received a standing ovation. This led to a meeting of delegates from almost 75 unions, which formally set up a Local Labor for McGovern Committee.

The revolt in Southern California is typical of events which have taken place in AFL-CIO organizations since the Democratic convention. Meany and the top AFL leadership backed Humphrey for the nomination. After McGovern was nominated, the 45 member AFL Executive Council met and passed a resolution declaring the Federation's neutrality in the campaign. The motion was pushed through by Meany, despite strong resistance.

Warnings Issued

Many then sent out strong warnings against supporting McGovern to all state and local contacts. Punitive sanctions were threatened if they did, although individual unions could take a position in the campaign.

Opposition to Meany's orders from state and local labor officials and rank and file members has grown. This represents an increasing opposition to national AFL policies. Meany has been a strong supporter of Nixon's Vietnam policy, and has

lobbied in Congress for the SST, the ABM, and higher defense budgets. He sat on the pay board, helping to enforce Nixon's wage freeze.

McGovern Support Grows

Such actions have eroded Meany's support within the unions. Support for McGovern is now rising in the labor movement, and many unions both in and out of the AFL-CIO are planning to work for McGovern.

A National Labor Committee for McGovern has been formed, with 27 AFL-CIO units joining so far. These include many of the nation's largest unions, such as the United Auto Workers, the Meatcutters, the Machinists, and many others.

The committee's aim is to use its \$250,000 budget to put out literature and publicity to encourage the rank and file to vote for McGovern. In many parts of the country, including Southern California, Local Labor for McGovern Committees are working closely with the McGovern campaign.

At this time, the McGovern candidacy may have only a slight effect on the AFL-CIO and the labor movement as a whole. But new relationships are developing between the Democratic Party regulars, pro-McGovern union leaders, and the McGovern campaign organization. The rank and file may now be stimulated to challenge the traditional union leadership during and after the elections.

"What we need are not more millions on welfare rolls, but more millions on payrolls."

—1968 Campaign Brochure

"Government must say what it means and mean what it says. Economic credibility is the basis for confidence, and confidence is the basis for an ongoing prosperity."

—1970 Economic report to Congress

Nixonomics

On June 22, 1970, Nixon vetoed the hospital construction bill which provided for 50,000 jobs. (Congress overrode veto)

In addition, 25 million jobs were lost when Nixon refused to use \$12 billion in funds appropriated by Congress.

On December 16, 1970, Nixon vetoed the manpower training and employment bill which would have provided 600,000 public service jobs.

On June 29, 1971, Nixon vetoed the accelerated public works bill that would have created 120,000 jobs in communities with high unemployment.

WSC alternatives leak

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Fragment
of Laas

following a policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, his extraordinary reliance on bombing and electronic warfare indicates that he still does not believe in Vietnamization. Although Nixon is not using nuclear weapons in Indochina as he had proposed in the '50's, he is dropping the equivalent of 2 1/2 Hiroshimas every week.


President Nixon's justifications for mining the harbors and indiscriminately bombing north Vietnam are all the more insidious because The Pentagon Papers say repeatedly that, short of annihilation, bombing is ineffective. Like the strategic bombing survey after World War II, studies of the bombing of Indochina have concluded that such bombing kills many civilians, but will not end the war.

Furthermore, the Pentagon Papers were recently updated by the release of the secret National Security Study Memorandum No. 1. NSSM-1 was prepared for Nixon when he entered the White House and represented the opinions of all government agencies concerned with Vietnam in 1969. In brief, NSSM-1 told Nixon that the "domino theory" was bunk, that the Executive-bureaucracy was deeply divided over bombing policies, that any high hopes for Vietnamization were unfounded, and that no agency was willing to predict a US victory in the near future. The "pessimists" said that it would probably take 13.4 years for pacification to succeed; the "optimists" said it would only take 8.3 years!

President Nixon's handling of the war indicates that he is continuing the fundamental policies of aggression and deception exposed by the Pentagon Papers.

Nixon's major public deception is the claim to be ending the war by withdrawing ground troops while dropping more bombs on Vietnam than have ever been dropped on a country in the history of the world. His major self-deception is the idea that he can end the war short of annihilating the people of Indochina.

ARE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AN ALIEN POWER?



As citizens we are told that the purpose of secrecy in government is to keep vital defense information out of enemy hands. But the Pentagon Papers show that our Presidents have been fighting three enemies: 1) the Vietnamese, 2) Congress and 3) us! Therefore, since WE are the real ENEMY of the Executive's war, Dan and Tony are being charged with espionage for giving us the truth.

Ironically, the Pentagon Papers reveal that the power of the American people is still potent.

The Papers contain many reports of Presidential attempts to mold and manipulate public opinion out of fear that if the American people knew the truth about the war, they would act to end it. As the Assistant Sec. of Defense wrote in May of 1967: "I see this war as a race between, on the one hand, the development of a viable South Vietnam and on the other, a gradual loss in public support, or even tolerance, for the war." This is why five Administrations have made such strenuous efforts to keep the American people in the dark.

This is also why it is so vitally important that Dan Ellsberg and Tony Russo be acquitted. In the Pentagon Papers Trial the Executive Branch of the United States government is viewing the American people as an ALIEN POWER.

Therefore, a conviction would permanently establish the government as an enemy of the people.

ALL PAPERS TO THE PEOPLE!

NSM-1 - 6040
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such an echo. How can you hear in back? OK? All right. If you have trouble, let me know. Wave, or something. Day before yesterday was an anniversary for me. The third anniversary actually, of the night when TONY RUSSO and I started Xeroxing the Pentagon Papers so that I could give them later to the Senate Formulations Committee that fall, October 1, 1969, three years ago, this three million tons of bombs ago. So, if we had great confidence in the ability, let's say, on that stage of the war for one act like that, or one piece of information to end it very rapidly, one would have to say we'd failed. I don't think we thought it was up to us or I thought it was up to me to end the war. I really didn't have that power. The President of the United States could end it. Anyone of his predecessors for twenty years could have ended it. All that was up to me to do really was to decide whether I continued to conceal certain information that I had in my possession, access, to continue to keep it in my safe and to work it over as an expert on research, doing research for the Government, or whether this was information that the American people ought to know and that I would be wrong to continue to conceal. That was my problem. I solved it for reasons I'll come to later, perhaps, as far as I was concerned, on, in September and October of 1969. Actually, the information didn't get to the American people for another

DE - anta xeroxing
Senate For Rel Comm 37 C

Actually, I was the only person.....Can you hear this now? How? Let's see.....You can't hear me I suppose if I don't use the mike? How's this? OK. If you, if you see me moving my head or something.....Like this? OK. I'll try this. I'll try to.....to get a head brace here....

People have asked me really a lot, and actually over the last year, what there was to learn -- what there is in the Pentagon Papers. As I say, the, the Administration took them about as seriously, took the revelations as seriously as I did. For me it was a very unusual act. I'd worked for the Executive for 12 years, or 15, counting the Marine Corps, and, for me Congress was the enemy as much as Russia was the enemy. Taking something to a Senator was about as, as likely for me to do as defecting to Russia; taking it to the press even less. So I had to consider it, it was fairly important to get this information out; to do something that I knew at the very least meant an entire change in my career, to say the least, a loss of clearance probably, of job, of career, and probably the, likelihood of prosecution. I didn't know the law well then; I'd worked for the Executive for 12 years. I'd assumed, ^{above} we were both the law. I didn't have much occasion to know much about the Bill of Rights or the Constitution, but I assumed there was something that they would try to prosecute me on. For their part, it's turned out, although I didn't

DE - Violate Exec 10501
violate law

40 C

realize it at the time that the prosecution was as unprecedented an act for the Administration in the life of our republic as my act of revealing the papers was in my own. It was as unprecedented as the Administration's attempt to enjoin the publication of the papers. No source to a newspaper of any kind of information, classified or not, had ever been indicted for, ever been prosecuted. I knew that. I knew that there were leaks all the time; that what I had done didn't differ in kind from what was done, really, every day, literally, certainly several times a week in Government. I knew that no one had ever been prosecuted, at least to my knowledge, I had a very vague sense of why that was. After a year of being fairly close to the legal aspects of this and beginning to pick up a little of it, as a layman, I find out that this is because there was no law that had been violated. Under existing law, really, there are certain kinds of information having to do with codes or nuclear weapons data that are proscribed, that are criminal if they're revealed to an unauthorized person just by statute of Congress. That does not apply to the enormous, the overwhelming bulk of classified information. It's classified entirely on the basis, I now understand, of Executive Order, that is an Administrative System. The President can't make laws in a sense of criminal statutes, can't send people to prison for disobeying his directives, unless there's a statute

DE- on practice (leaks)
not violate law

4/1 C

But maybe that answers itself. The Government is not anxious to have it realized that this was the perception that from the very origins, and I might say these, these same quotations go on again and again and again in the official documentation, weren't anxious to realize, have us realize that the Presidents were told, five of them in a row, that this was essentially a legitimate effort in terms of our principles and of international law. It was an effort against the Vietnamese people.....and so forth.

In fact, the earliest chronological deletion in the Government printing office version is really from a month before that, December 19, that incident as I've described, a few weeks before it actually. It was an incident of November, late November, in which the French deliberately provoked a conflict in Haiphong and then with their war ships off shore, shelled the worker suburbs of Haiphong and bombed them in planes, which shells and bombs supplied by us, essentially, and killed by their count, the French count, 6,000 civilians in Haiphong in the month of November, 1946. That's what led to the outbreak of war a few weeks later.

Well, does it take really a tremendous insight to know why that is white space in the Government printing office version? You know, it might have seemed frightening in a way 25 years ago.....that incident. But I can understand why the Defense

DG - leak?
bombing in '46 of Haiphong
SAC

question answers itself, the last question. Having decided to do something that at best would prolong the war, would stalemate it at that moment. He probably couldn't get much support from Congress if he really told them frankly that this was against the advice of all of his advisors. He didn't have to believe his advisors, but, he wouldn't get the support. So, he chose to lie, to say that, and the secrecy had the effect then of preserving that lie, protecting him then. I might say that I always wondered who it was in the White House that had given out that word directly, in part of this, the President's turned out, but some time later, really, last year, when my wife and I, a very hot period, in June of 1971, when we were still out of sight, while I was giving copies of the Pentagon Papers to the various newspapers, I saw TAYLOR on television speaking to MARTIN ABRONSKY who was asking him if, the thing had actually been taped earlier, what about this recommendation in 1961. I knew, by the way, that TAYLOR's cable was about to come out in New York Times the next day because they had announced they were covering the KENNEDY decisions the next day. So, I heard TAYLOR saying, and I sort of felt like saying stop, wait, and watch it. This cable is about to come out. But, TAYLOR said to ABRONSKY, "I did not recommend combat forces. I stressed that we bring in engineer forces,

DE- newspapers

63C

DANIEL ELLSBERG

Ellsberg: The broader government, the press, the Congress, the courts, the public, really had to take a more active role to cover these presidents and their policy, but I do not think I saw this until I read the earliest period. The other part of the earliest period was to reveal the war as really having been illegitimate in its origin. Again in all these wrap-ups we hear great emphasis on the good intentions that brought us, not that sent us astray. Now the intentions that we see when we read those papers are very clear. In 1946, 7, 8, 9, 50, right through 54, we were to back up what we clearly saw as a French attempt at the military re-conquest of its former colony. Although that may look like good intentions to, even to a Frenchman or an Englishman, even today with their colonial past, it is really hard for an American to read that period and say that was good intention.

Marie: Well, what transpired between the time that you made up your mind to do it, and actually did it. Did you discuss it with many people.

Ellsberg: It was a matter of hours.

Marie: A matter of hours.

Ellsberg: As a matter of fact, I woke up one day, I told the story before and I, a few times, but the general problem was very much on my mind, but the Pentagon Papers as a way of changing the situation did not come right away. I think I read the papers one morning about a new set of rules, the kind we find every week, but on that particular day it had to do with why a Green Beret murder case was being dropped, and everyone in the system from the Green Beret sergeant up through the head of the Green Berets and General Abrams, and the Secretary of the Army, and the President, himself, were all lying to protect their own responsibilities in this case, and I suddenly decided that this was enough.

DE- REASONS
GREEN BERET

88C

DANIEL ELLSBERG

Ellsberg: I had in my safe 7,000 pages of evidence on the spies. If this system of deception is ever going to change it is only going to be because people understand how pervasive it is, and I said okay, I am not going to lie any more on this subject.

Marie: You did not talk it over with your wife, or..

Ellsberg: I was not married then, and thought it were near it, my wife and I, Patricia, whom I am now married to, were not together at all then. I went to a close friend, Tony Russo, and, said "Can you find a xerox machine somewhere," and we have never been able to remember whether it was that night or the next night that we started xeroxing the papers.

Marie: We'll continue our program with Daniel Ellsberg in just a moment. I mentioned to Dr. Daniel Ellsberg a moment ago, or fifteen minutes ago that Vice President Agnew was not among those people who were, what you might say, touched by your nobleness in revealing the papers, the Pentagon Papers, and there was an article in yesterday's "New York Times," which had to do with Vice President Agnew's appearance on a TV show on which he said and I'm quoting, I'm quoting from this article, "whether a person steals Larry O'Brien's secret papers, or steals the Pentagon Papers, he should be punished." This is Spiro Agnew speaking. "I didn't see any of these cries of moral indignation against the person accused of stealing the Pentagon Papers." Will you respond to that Dr. Ellsberg.

Ellsberg: Well, I think as I said earlier the dominant cry, or the dominant communication that went out was a 115 year indictment issued from the Justice Department. I happen to think, by the way, that that was their form of the cry of moral outrage. Uh, no law as far as we can tell, my lawyers and I can tell, no law has been broken in this case by any earlier interpretation, of the existing law, but I think they were trying to tell the public something by that indictment. It's an expensive one for me. I guess they were trying to tell the press that whether they can even

DE- TR- XEROX
DE- REASONS
GREEN BEAR

89C

DANIEL ELLSBERG

majority of the Vietnamese people. Because his record is a Communist. The Communist background has many an influential figure in and about his government. Probably a lot of you have heard the estimate in Eisenhower's memoirs that 80 per cent or so of the people were supporters of Ho Chi Minh as against Valdi of the French Republic and we are continuing to support him in South Vietnam after '54. A lot of people thought, later Eisenhower would get that way, you know, about Vietnam and pull that out of the air, the fact is if every, you know Presidential memoirs are relatively classified documents, that's what they are, and this one, among others, ah...every estimate that has been made, that Eisenhower had ever seen, that's what he meant by every knowledgeable person I know said this, every estimate he had ever seen told him indeed that Ho Chi Minh continued to have support of the majority of the people. To read that, for me to read that, after the denial of such a position so long as....as top secret intelligence estimates of 48, 49, and 50, was for me a somewhat stunning experience. I didn't read till I came back in '57 with hepatitis and joined the Mc Namara study group that was compiling its history, that they were still top secret. Perhaps I don't have to explain why they remained in top secret until the Pentagon Papers came out last year. Not to keep from the Vietnamese enemy or the Russians or the Chinese the fact that we have been well aware we were fighting the majority of the Vietnamese people. Speaking of that, they were there. They were on the side of the Vietnamese people.... Russia and China. They knew that. We were telling them no secret then or certainly not now, 25 years later. How about the American people? They heard that trash, sure, they heard it from Norm Chomsky but they heard it denied by a succession of Presidents, and really between those authorities there's no contest for most Americans. For the sake

Johnson Sought Public Release of His Vietnam Papers

By Jules Witcover

Washington Post Staff Writer

AUSTIN, Texas, Jan. 24—At the time of his death, former President Lyndon B. Johnson was about to ask President Nixon to speed the declassification and public release of the private papers on Mr. Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam war.

Aware from White House briefings that a peace settlement was only a short time off, Mr. Johnson was waiting only for its consummation before acting, according to

Harry Middleton, director of the LBJ Library here.

Middleton said today that one of Mr. Johnson's chief motivations was his concern that the controversial Pentagon Papers covering the same period had presented an incomplete picture of Johnson policymaking in those years.

Last month, Middleton said, the former President asked him and Dr. Walt W. Rostow, Mr. Johnson's national security adviser at the White House and now a University of Texas professor, to explore the feasibility of speeding up release of the papers, many of which are classified top secret.

They did so, Middleton said in an interview at the LBJ Library, where the papers are stored, and submitted their recommendations to Mr. Johnson in late December. They suggested he ask President Nixon to send a team of administration experts on Vietnam to the library to examine all papers.

There are 471,000 pages of presidential papers in the Vietnam file alone, Middleton said, compared to 681,500 in another file containing papers dealing with Johnson administration policies toward other countries.

"President Johnson was very enthusiastic about the idea," Middleton said. "He said it was one of his first orders of business in the time ahead, but I feel quite certain that he had not raised it with President Nixon."

He really wanted not to present the administration with something based on an event that had not happened (the peace settlement)."

know whether the request still will be made, though he said he was aware of the tremendous interest among scholars, the press and the public that such early disclosure would generate.

"I don't know where we go on this now," the library director, a former Johnson speech writer at the White House, said. "I know the world without him is a different world than the world with him. With him behind us, I never had the slightest doubt we would go wherever we wanted to."

Middleton said he thought the late President's wife, Lady Bird, "would wish to do anything and everything for the library that the President would have wanted to do," but he had not had a chance to discuss the matter with her.

Rostow said he did not know, either, what would become of the plan to declassify the Vietnam papers now that Mr. Johnson had died. "President Johnson raked it with us and we laid out the situation with him," said Rostow. "What he planned to do, I don't know."

The LBJ Library, in conjunction with the University of Texas at which it is located, has used the Johnson papers as a focus for two major symposiums, one on education last January and one on civil rights last month.

Just before his death, according to Middleton, Mr. Johnson also had talked to him about a third symposium being planned on the broad subject of the crisis of the cities. The Johnson papers in that area were to be opened.

If, as in the past, an event featuring the public availability of Mr. Johnson's papers on

Vietnam were to be scheduled, it predictably would draw researchers on the war in droves.

Once before, in 1969, the library requested the Nixon administration to send a team to examine all the secret Johnson papers on international affairs, Middleton said.

The team was sent and found after looking at a selective portion that only about 11 per cent of the material could be declassified under the stringent regulations then in force, he said, most of only marginal interest. Another 10 per cent was considered "questionable" and would have required further examination, he said.

President Nixon, however, issued an executive order last spring expediting declassification. In their recommendations to Mr. Johnson, Middleton said, he and Rostow cited this development plus Mr. Johnson's own desire to have the papers cleared, as the best reasons he could give to President Nixon.

The letter of the Nixon executive order, Middleton said, would not permit declassification of any of the Johnson papers until late 1973—at the earliest 10 years after they were written. Many might have to remain secret 25 years, he said.

But Middleton and Rostow suggested that Mr. Johnson scize on the spirit of the order—which noted that too many papers were unnecessarily classified and stayed classified too long—to urge an exception.

Willingness of Mr. Nixon to take that step in itself would initiate a lengthy and painful screening process, the

library director said. The present administration would have to send experts on Vietnam from the Departments of State and Defense to gauge the "sensitivity" of the material, he said.

The Vietnam material actually exceeds the 471,000 pages in the Vietnam file, Middleton said. Perhaps as much as 100,000 or more additional pages deal with the war in some way but are categorized under some other title.

To Mr. Johnson, the completion and dedication of the LBJ Library in May 1971 was a consuming interest. He had a small working office in the huge concrete building overlooking the University of Texas football field, where he attended all but one home game last fall.

Before his second heart attack last April, Middleton said, the former President used the office often, but only infrequently since then. Now it has an unused look, the desk calendar turned to Sunday, Jan. 7, and unmarked. Three small television sets in a console above the desk stand in silent recollection of his frenetic White House days, when he almost constantly monitored the three networks' news shows.

There is a phone on a table next to the desk, another console by an armchair, and in the adjoining Oval Office—a full-scale replica of the one from which he ran the country for five years—a drawer has been left open in a coffee table, revealing still another phone console with a maze of buttons.

Associates used to say that President Johnson, one of the

great talkers and persuaders of his time, had a phone growing out of his ear. The exhibit is a reminder of that characteristic, though no lights flash on the console now and no voice is heard.

Mr. Johnson's interest in the public side of the library equalled his interest in the private collection of papers. He saw the library as a museum for Americans.

"He wanted to bring the presidency close to the people who would never get to see it," Middleton said.

"That's why he had the Oval Office replica built," he said, "and not because, as some wags suggested, he wanted to be able to go in and sit there."

To the first-time visitor, one of the most surprising parts of the library is a small exhibit, just off the great hall where Mr. Johnson's body lay in state Tuesday. It depicts the controversies of his presidential term, including Vietnam.

Included is a graph that shows how the popularity of his Vietnam policy dipped dur-

ing his White House. The letter 13 Democrats sent him in January criticizing his war copy of the Gulf Resolution of 1964 with the Senate Ratification of Wayne Morse, D-Ernest Gruening warning of its dire effects.

"A few weeks before the library opened," Middleton called, "the President's people walking through aren't going to get a sense of the turbulence of the time. There shouldn't be a sign that."

The exhibit, which was put together by some of the staff shown to him there, agreed that they had a difficult job.

The early political papers on Vietnam, of course, provide a picture of the turbulent period. Johnson's attitude then anything else, death leaves that part certain at best.

ANALYSIS OF BASIC PROVISIONS

Paris Agreement Resembles 1954 Geneva Accord

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 BY FOX BUTTERFIELD
 DENVER POST-N. Y. TIMES
 HON — The agreement
 Secretary of State William
 Rogers signed Saturday in
 bears a remarkable re-
 semblance in its basic provi-
 sions to the Geneva Accords of
 1954. In fact, that
 19 years after an earlier
 Secretary of State, John Foster

Dulles, refused to endorse the
 Geneva settlement, the United
 States had finally agreed to its
 major terms. The consequences
 that flowed from that refusal in
 1954 have been enormous. The
 Eisenhower administration's na-
 tional Security Council, meeting
 in August 1954, shortly after the
 Geneva conference ended, de-
 clared the accords were a "dis-

aster." That "may lead to the
 loss of Southeast Asia" unless
 checked by American action. A
 few weeks later the first teams
 of American advisers were sent
 to Vietnam.

Now, in a great historical
 shift, after the loss of more
 than 45,000 American lives and
 several hundred billion dollars,
 the man who was vice pres-

ident at the time of the Geneva
 conference, Richard M. Nixon,
 has accepted much the same
 settlement.

TEMPORARY PARTITION

As for the similarities, 9 in es-
 sence to Geneva and the Paris
 agreements call for the tempo-
 rary partition of Vietnam into a
 Communist north and a shaky
 non-Communist south. In each

agreement, the future of South
 Vietnam is to be decided by an
 election; but without any guar-
 antee it will be held.

Laos and Cambodia are to be
 neutralized, and all foreign
 troops — French in the original
 instance, American in the
 present — must pull out of all
 of Indochina. Both settlements
 are to be overseen by a small

and largely powerless inter-
 national commission.

If the provisions of the two
 settlements are strikingly simi-
 lar, they were framed against a
 similar background of interna-
 tional forces.

In 1954, France was exhaust-
 ed and bitterly divided by the
 Indochina war, which had been
 going on for eight years.

President Nixon faced a na-
 tion exhausted and torn by a
 war that had been going on, in
 its intensive form, for seven
 years.

At least equally important, in
 both 1954 and this past year,
 the Soviet Union and China
 were seriously committed to
 seeking a peaceful solution.

At the time of Geneva, the
 Russians were worried that
 under American pressure the
 West European nations, espe-
 cially West Germany, would es-
 tablish an organization known
 as the European defense Co-
 munity as a stronger successor
 to the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
 ganization (NATO).

NEW DEFENSE GROUP

The Russians hoped that by
 appearing conciliatory and by
 getting the Vietnamese Commu-
 nist delegates at Geneva to
 offer concessions, France would
 stay out of the new defense
 group. After the Russians ap-
 parently did persuade Ho Chi
 Minh to back down in his
 demand for control of all Viet-
 nam, not just part, the French
 National Assembly voted
 against the defense proposal.

In much the same way, the
 Russians are thought to have
 put pressure on Hanoi recently
 to moderate its insistence that
 President Nguyen Van Thieu
 resign before it would consider
 a cease-fire and the release of
 American prisoners. The rea-
 sons for Moscow's help appear
 to be its desire for a general
 European disarmament confer-
 ence and for American trade
 and technical assistance.

In 1954, the Chinese were just
 emerging from the Korean war
 and, under the guidance of
 Premier Chou En-lai, were em-
 barking on a moderate foreign
 policy that stressed the so-
 called five principles of peace-
 ful coexistence. Like the Rus-
 sians, the Chinese sought to
 convince their non-Communist
 neighbors of their friendly in-
 tentions, and Chou is thought to
 have played a decisive role
 when, just before the end of the
 Geneva conference, he met with
 Ho Chi Minh on the Chinese-